How Football Works: Third-man combinations in the double pivot

June 13, 2024

When Xabi Alonso played for Pep Guardiola’s Bayern Munich, he usually operated as a lone defensive midfielder, presumably because he was so handsome that team-mates were too intimidated to stand next to him.

Not many clubs play that way now. A decade of increasingly sophisticated pressing has forced sides that want to build up through the middle (as opposed to going over or around the other team) to put two bodies on their defensive midfield line.

Lately, some ambitious teams have been learning to use their pair of defensive midfielders — the so-called “double pivot” — in close, fast build-up passing patterns to lure the opponent’s press forward and then break it. One of them is coached by none other than Xabi Alonso, who stood alone, handsomely, on the touchline at the Allianz Arena last weekend, watching his Bayer Leverkusen break Bayern Munich’s lines with ease and attack quickly through the middle in improbable amounts of space.

Their secret weapon was third-man combinations in the double pivot.

If you haven’t heard of what coaches like to call the “third man”, it’s basically what it sounds like. Let’s say Player A would like to pass to Player B, but there’s an opponent in the way. Instead, Player A passes to Player C — the third man — who quickly relays the ball to Player B. The first pass draws the defence’s attention the wrong way, while the second pass reaches Player B from an unobstructed angle.

Body orientation is important here. Even if Player A had been able to pass straight to Player B, the receiver would have been facing towards the passer and would have to turn on the ball to face goal, which can be tricky in tight spaces. Bringing a third man into the pattern allows Player B to receive the ball already facing goal, giving them a better view of the pitch to play forward. Done right, third-man combinations are basically a cheat code for working the ball upfield fast.

Let’s look at an example of how Leverkusen did it against Bayern.

The pattern starts when Harry Kane chases a wall pass from Granit Xhaka back to the centre-back Edmond Tapsoba (How Football Works readers will recall that wall passes can be a good way to bait the press). Xhaka is left unmarked on the second line, but the angle of Kane’s pressure cuts off Tapsoba’s passing lane to him. Leverkusen need a third man to relay the ball.

That’s where the other player in the double pivot comes in:

Not only does the third-man combination work the ball around Kane, it allows Xhaka to receive facing forward so that he can immediately play a one-touch pass through the next line of defence.

But Leverkusen don’t stop there. As soon as he makes the initial layoff, the second pivot, Robert Andrich, turns to run upfield to create yet another third-man combination that leaves him free in front of Bayern’s back line to try a final through ball to the striker. The attack has gone back-to-front in seven seconds flat.

That sudden change of tempo, from patiently passing around the back to bursting up the middle with a chain of rapid-fire passing and movement, is one reason coaches love these third-man combinations on the defensive midfield line. Leverkusen draw out the press by receiving risky-looking passes while facing away from goal (Xhaka’s wall pass, Andrich’s third-man layoff) and then they rush to attack the holes the pressers leave behind.

Double pivots didn’t always work like this. Back when Guardiola played defensive midfielder, he hated the awkward right angles that a defensive midfield pair created in the build-up. The key to making this style work is keeping the two pivots very close together, at carefully staggered heights, so they can combine faster than the opposition can react.

Even when it’s well-drilled, one-touch passing in the most dangerous part of the pitch isn’t exactly risk-free. More than once against Bayern, Leverkusen were caught out when a stray short pass led to a very uncomfortable situation like this:

But Leverkusen are willing to invite pressure and risk the occasional turnover in exchange for all the space their style opens up behind the pressing team’s lines. Even just the threat of a third-man combination sometimes drew Bayern players out of position, allowing Leverkusen to slip line-breaking passes through the gaps.

The specific tactics may be different, but the general idea is pretty similar to how Alonso describes his role in Rafa Benitez’s old Liverpool side, when he would draw an opponent toward him in the double pivot in order to free up Steven Gerrard between the lines: “If I was getting close (to Liverpool’s centre-backs), I would attract this player, so this space — we could play straight to Stevie and he would get the ball and make either the run or the last pass to Torres. It’s all about the space and who is the free man.”

If all of this sounds familiar to current Premier League fans, it’s probably because of Roberto De Zerbi’s Brighton, who have elevated double pivot combination play into an art form. Last season, they played more third-man passing patterns through the middle than any other team in the league:

This season, opponents are scrambling to come up with ways to stop Brighton’s favourite gimmick. Manchester United’s approach last weekend was to press in a 4-4-2 diamond: two forwards would cut off passing lanes from Brighton’s centre-backs to the defensive midfielders, and if a pass did slip through, Bruno Fernandes would be waiting between the two pivots to cut off the relay to a third man.

As a tactic to interrupt central combination play, United’s diamond was effective against Brighton’s box and they controlled the first half-hour of the match. But stacking the midfield with four men meant leaving Brighton’s full-backs free on the flanks. Rather than play through United’s midfield, Brighton began simply going around the outside of them, overloading the wings with wide triangles.

Thirty passes. Goal. De Zerbismo. 💫 pic.twitter.com/2PLlE5aJeS

— Brighton & Hove Albion (@OfficialBHAFC) September 17, 2023

That love of width is a key point of difference between Brighton and Leverkusen. Even when De Zerbi’s team do play through the middle, their next pass usually goes out wide to put a winger one-on-one. Leverkusen are much more central and direct — which may just be another way to say more German — in their preference for breaking straight ahead through their playmaker Florian Wirtz rather than attacking up the wings.

But both teams cause opponents similar headaches in the build-up with the way their narrow, staggered double pivot can scramble a press and push the tempo. As this trend continues to develop, it’ll be interesting to watch how opponents find ways to break up those combinations and tip the risk-reward balance in favour of the pressing team.

For now, though, it all looks intimidatingly handsome.

ncG1vNJzZmismJqutbTLnquim16YvK57k3FvbGplanxzfJFsZmlxX2d%2FcLTOsGSfp5%2Bpr6K4y2auqKqbqHqxrdGtZK2vn2Q%3D